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A multivariate approach for identification of optimal locations with in 
Ethiopia’s wheat market to tackle soaring inflation on food price 
 
I. Introduction 
 
After years of low and some times negative inflation, Ethiopia was experiencing soaring 
food and general inflation in period of 2003 to 2009. In 2000 the level of inflation in 
consumer price index was 6.2%. In the following two years of 2001 and 2002, a deflation 
rate of 5.2% and 7.2%, respectively, was observed (WB, 2008/9). This pattern was 
common pattern in the entire period extended from 1991 to 2002. However in recent 
years and mainly since 2006, the country was experiencing double digit inflation, 
reaching more than 40% in 2008. (IMF, 2008)      
 
The inflation, of the period, is mainly related to ever soaring food prices. (IMF, 2008 and 
Loening et al., 2009). What is puzzling is that the unprecedented level of inflation on 
food prices is observed when the data (NBE, 2008 and MoFED, 2008a) is showing that 
the country was having a pamper harvest of agricultural products.  
 
Given the unprecedented and speedy rise on crude oil and internal food prices, at the 
time, it is very tempting to associate the rise in domestic prices with international 
dynamics. Actually, a study by Loening et al (2009) did found that the main causes of 
inflation in the long run are the foreign exchange rate and the international price of food 
and none food items. In short run, supply shocks and inflation inertia followed by money 
supply growth are strong determinants of inflation. It is hard to swallow the above result, 
when most of the inflation is observed in staple grains; which are none tradable for the 
country
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 and when domestic oil price is increasingly subsidized by state, with every 
increase in international price of oil. Moreover a study by Ulimwengu et al (2009) did 
show that domestic maize price are not cointegrated with international maize price; which 
support the view that Ethiopian food inflation, which is the major cause of the over all 
inflation, is not caused by Global or regional factors but by domestic factors. If this 
conclusion was wrong, there should be a correlation between Ethiopia’s and similar 
countries’ inflation.  But still the level of inflation observed in the country is much higher 
than the inflation observed in neighboring countries (IMF, 2008) and Sub Saharan 
African Countries (MoFED, 2008b).  
 
Understanding the real source of the problem can improve the effectiveness of any 
intervention. However agreement does not seem to exist, between stakeholders, about the 
real source of the problem and associated solution to the problem (see IMF, 2008). One 
of the possible solutions forwarded by government is to intervene in grain markets, 
through international purchase and distribution of white wheat in to the domestic 
economy (MoFED, 2008b). Such intervention, in order to be effective and efficient, 
needs to be targeted in optimal locations; where effective stabilizing intervention can be 
done with least possible cost. In this paper such locations are identified by using a vector 
error correction model (VECM) developed by Johansen (1988, 1991, 1992) with search 
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 The same study by Loening et al (2009) did state that food imports are less than 5% of agricultural GDP, 
for example.    
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criteria for one common trend introduced by Gonzalez – Rivera and Helfand (2001). The 
short run dynamics of the market are articulated by analyzing the adjustment parameters 
estimated in VECM and persistence profile for system level shock developed by Pesaran 
and Shin (1996). Additionally markets which are having major impact on the long run 
common trend, which in turn is keeping the prices under rule of one price, is estimated by 
following Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common trend estimation methodology.  
         
The data used for this paper is collected by European Union and is obtained from 
Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE). The data is extended from 1980 to 2003. 
Unfortunately, most of the data for pre 1996 was highly incomplete and less reliable, 
since it is compiled from different secondary sources. However for 8 wholesale markets, 
more or less, complete monthly data is found from 1996 to 2003. There are few randomly 
missing values but they are extrapolated from the data. To extrapolate the missing values, 
first the price is regressed on monthly dummy and year. Then the predicted values are 
used as initial value. Then given monthly nature of the data auto regressive model with 
15 lags or AR(15) is fitted and the predicted values are replaced for the originally missing 
values. And recursive estimation, prediction and replacement are done until the 
difference between previously used value and new predicted value becomes 
approximately zero. The basic idea is to extrapolate the needed information from the data 
itself, by using the information contained on the lagged values of the level price. 
Following this introductory part, the theoretical base of the analysis and methodology 
used in this paper will be explained in part 2 and 3, respectively. In part 4 results of data 
analysis will be presented, to be followed by conclusion and policy implication in part 5.      
 
II. Theoretical framework for spatial cointegration of prices    
 
Theoretically, the difference between spatial price margin and the transaction cost of 
creating space utility will determine the market boundary of a given out put. Following 
the price bound model, there will be profitable price arbitration between two locations, if 
the price margin between the two locations is higher than the transaction cost of creating 
space utility (Baulch, 1997; Sexton et al.; 1991 and Spiller and Wood, 1988). In highly 
competitive market, with adequate flow of information and highly functional credit 
market, contract enforcement institutional setup, risk management capabiltiy and 
marketing infrastructure, the most important transaction cost in creating space utility is 
transportation cost. In such location, assuming transportation infrastructure, distribution 
of transportation service and distribution of demand is highly homogenous, the boundary 
of a given firm’s market will be determined by distance only. As result there will be high 
level of price arbitration between closely located markets compared to distantly located 
markets. This is the logical base of early spatial models of Christaller (1933), Isard 
(1956), Losch (1954), Von Thunen (1826) and Weber (1909). 
       
The problem is that the world, and especially the developing side of the world, is not as 
simple as the classical or neoclassical models assumed it to be. There is widely 
documented evidence to support that grain trading in developing economies is 
constrained by lack of finance, adequate storage facility, adequate marketing 
infrastructure, modern marketing skill, efficient contract enforcement mechanism, 
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adequate risk management capacity and adequate information (Rapsomanikis and 
Karfakis, 2007; Gabre-Madhin, 2001 , 2001b; Gabre-Madhin et al.; 2003, Fafchamps and 
Minten; 1999, 1999b; Fafchamps, 1996, 2003;  Jayne et al., 2002; Bigsten et al., 1998; 
Barrett, 1997; Rauch and Casella, 1998; Bryceson, 1994; World Bank, 2002 and 
McMillan and Woodruff, 1998). 
  
However institutional economists and sociologists (Stiglitz, 2000; Gabre-Madhin, 2001; 
Grootaert, 1998; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004; Guiso et al, 2000; Fafchamps and 
Minten, 1999, 2002; Fafchamps, 1996, 2002, 2006; Greif, 1993; Platteau, 1994 and 
McMillan and Woodruff, 2000) did show that when the market and the state are not well 
developed, to provide Pareto optimal incentive to coordination economic agents to ward 
optimal goals, local institutions will develop to fill part of the gap. The widely 
documented alternative institutional response in (grain) trading, labor market and 
consumption smoothing is networking (Fafchamps and Minten, 1999, 1999b, 2002; 
Fafchamps et al., 1994; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004; Fafchamps, 1996, 1997, 2002; 
Gabre-Madhin, 2001, 2001b; Gabre-Madhin et al., 2003; World Bank, 2002; Grootaert, 
1998; Overa, 2006; Lyon, 2000; Greif, 1993; Coleman, 1988; Rauch and Casella, 1998; 
Moore, 1999;  Kranton and Minehart, 2000;  Kranton, 1996; Edwards and Ogilvie, 2009; 
Barr, 2000; Harbord, 2006; Palaskas and  Harriss-white, 1993 and McMillan and 
Woodruff, 1998). Traders by developing networks based on social capital of trust and 
(collective or bilateral) sanction will not only able to improve their liquidity, but also the 
level of information that they can collect from different locations. By working as family 
worker in currently networked trader/s, they will gain the necessary skills and reputation 
they need to function in highly imperfect market. Networks can minimize the formal 
contract enforcement cost of trading and credit provision, by depending on trust and 
collective or bilateral sanction. Moreover networks can reduce search and screening cost 
to transform the grain market from less efficient flee market to ward more efficient 
reputation based market. So, well developed trade under highly imperfect market 
structure will be possible, if and only if the necessary informal institutions are developed 
to fill the gap of the formal sectors. If not the market will end up being a flee market 
(Fafchamps, 2002; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999, 1999b and Minten and Kyle, 1999).  
 
The million dollar question is ‘what factors determine the development of such 
institutions?’ The critical juncture hypothesis assumes that historical factors will mainly 
determine the development of local institutions (Fedderke, 2001 and Acemoglu et al. 
2009). In areas with history of wide spread trust and intergenerational trading culture, 
there are large chances that there will be adequate social capital to facilitate trade (Greif 
1993). In simple words it means institutional development is path dependent and history 
does matter! (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004; Lyon, 2000; Kranton, 1996; Greif, 1993 and 
Fedderke, 2001) 
  
However additional research on game theory by Fafchamps (2002), Ghosh and Ray 
(1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000) did show that the level of expected trading gain in 
addition to networking cost will determine the level of spontaneous trust based market 
development. Means when the expected gain from trade is very high, which is related to 
structure of production and consumption, there will be high chance of cooperative 
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outcome based on trust. The second important variable is networking cost. The cost 
involved in creating and maintaining link with other traders. There are two but related 
costs. One cost is related to trustworthy traders and another is the networking cost of the 
cheaters. So social capital will be effective, if the networking cost of the trustworthy 
trader is very low (Fafchamps, 2002) and the networking cost of the cheater is very high 
(Fafchamps, 2002; Kranton, 1996; Greif, 1993 and Coleman, 1988). If the networking 
cost of the trustworthy trader is very low, he/she can use bilateral or collective sanction 
(Fafchamps, 2002; Kranton and Minehart, 2000; Greif, 1993; McMillan and Woodruff, 
2000 and Harbord, 2006) or can demand compensation (Harbord, 2006) to achieve 
cooperative out come. Sanctions or compensation by imposing higher future networking 
cost for the cheater will result on more cooperation and efficiency (Fafchamps, 2002; 
Moore, 1999; Kranton, 1996; Greif, 1993; Coleman, 1988; McMillan and Woodruff, 
1998, 2000 and Harbord, 2006,). However as shown by Fafchamps (2002) neither 
sanction nor compensation are necessary for cooperative out come. When the search cost 
is very high (which will increase the networking cost of trustworthy trader) compensation 
or sanction can seriously affect the future profit of the trustworthy trader. However, if the 
gain from trade is very high, the existence of large number of cheaters in market will 
improve cooperation among trustworthy traders (Fafchamps, 2002 and Ghosh and Ray, 
1996). But the out come would be much efficient, if collective sanctions or 
compensations are used (Fafchamps, 2002; Ghosh and Ray, 1996 and Harbord, 2006). As 
result, in general, factors which determine the networking cost of both trustworthy and 
untrustworthy trader will determine the development of networks.  
 
Socio-cultural and historical factors have important role to play in determination of these 
costs. Studies did found that ethnic, family, linguistic and religious similarity, in addition 
to generic personal relationship, can be effective in promoting meso level trust. 
(Fafchamps, 1997, 1999; Moore, 1999; Overa, 2006; Lyon, 2000; Greif, 1993; Coleman, 
1988; Barr, 2000; Platteau, 1994, 1994b; McMillan and Woodruff, 1998, 2000; World 
Bank, 2002; Bryceson, 1994; Fafchamps and  Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and  Gubert, 2007 
and Palaskas and  Harriss-white, 1993). However additional studies did show that 
religious, (Fafchamps, 1996, 2003; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999b; Minten and Kyle, 
1999 and Alesinaa and La Ferrara, 2002) linguistic (Fafchamps and Minten, 1999b) and 
ethnic (Fafchamps and Minten, 1999, 1999b; Fafchamps, 2003; Minten and Kyle, 1999; 
Bigsten et al., 1998; Edwards and Ogilvie, 2009; Alesinaa and La Ferrara, 2002; 
McMillan and Woodruff and 1998, Gabre-Madhin, 2001b) similarity are not effective in 
facilitating trade in all locations and all cases. Means religion, language and ethnicity can 
be important in some locations and times, but not in all locations and times.   
 
Other factors that can promote trust includes frequency of interaction and associated 
reputation development (Stiglitz, 2000; Glaeser et al., 1999, 2000;  Fafchamps and 
Minten, 1999, 1999b, 2001; Fafchamps, 2002; Moore, 1999; Overa, 2006; Lyon, 2000; 
Greif, 1993; Platteau, 1994; McMillan and Woodruff, 1998, 2000; World Bank, 2002 and 
Gabre-Madhin 2001b), distance (Glaeser et al., 2000; Overa, 2006; McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2000; Fafchamps and  Lund, 2003 and Fafchamps and  Gubert, 2007) and 
quality of transportation and communication infrastructure (Overa, 2006). Normally, 
people which are frequently dealing with each other, located in close distance and are 
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able to communicate and interact easily will have better capacity to monitor the behivor 
of each other. As result they will have better capacity to develop trust based networks. 
Again as stated above history did matter for development of networks. Networks and 
trusts can be inherited from generation to generation not only with in families, but also 
with communities through statistical discrimination (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001; 
Fafchamps, 1999; Greif, 1993; Coleman, 1988 and Platteau, 1994). 
 
Additionally big traders and rich people have more chance of having dense networks than 
poor or small scale traders. (Glaeser et al., 1999, 2000; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999, 
1999b; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Fafchamps, 1997; Alesinaa and La Ferrara, 2002 
and Gabre-Madhin et al., 2003). Education and age (up to a limit) are observed to 
increase social capital (Glaeser et al., 1999, 2000; Alesinaa and La Ferrara, 2002 and 
Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). However Guiso et al (2000) in Italia found that meso and 
micro level social capital is negatively related to education. And Barr (2000) found that 
small scale, poor investors, will invest more on social capital. Similar results are also 
found in Vietnam by McMillan and Woodruff (1998). In general the effect capital, 
education, wealth, ethnicity and religion on development of social capital are found to be 
sample specific.        
 
Moreover, the development of trading network in one commodity is expected to be 
highly affected by the general development of networks, dealing in other commodities of 
the same location. This is so, since the development of social capital, marketing 
infrastructure and trading skill is dependent on the over all, past and present, trade flow 
of the area. In areas with adequate in flow and out flow of goods, there will be conducive 
environment for development of both formal and informal institutions. If the location is a 
major coffee exporter for example, the dominant export commodity for Ethiopia, social 
capital and storage facility will be relatively well developed in that location. Given 
critical shortage of foreign exchange, the state has more incentive to invest on marketing 
infrastructure of such location. The skill developed and experience gained in coffee 
market will be also useful for functioning and operating profitable trading enterprise in 
other related commodities and markets. At the same time historical factors, like the 
pattern of colonial expansion and early trading history of the area will determine, not 
only the level of social capital in given area, but also the level of both marketing 
infrastructure and trading skill of a given area.  
 
The general point is that, in line with critical juncture hypothesis history does matter! But 
every thing is not about history (Glaeser et al., 1999; Fafchamps and Minten. 2001 and 
Fafchamps, 1999). Spontaneous trust can also develop, if the gain from trading is very 
high and there are right economic conditions to promote network development. For 
example a study by Palaskas and Harriss-white (1993) in West Bengal did show that new 
markets can easily out perform established markets, when things are right. Given these 
facts it is logical to conclude that markets with long lasting trading history, high flow of 
products, high level of potential arbitrage benefit, adequate formal and informal 
marketing infrastructures will have stronger cointegration with other markets and will 
have speed-full correction of shocks.  
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Unfortunately social capital is not productive in all cases. An analysis by Arnott and 
Stiglitz (1988) in insurance market pointed the fact that local institutions could be 
functional, but are not necessarily Pareto optimal. To make things worst they can, 
possibly, kill the development potential of much efficient market institutions. Many 
researchers either based on theoretical reasoning  (Stiglitz, 2000; Grootaert, 1998; 
Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2002, 2004, 2006; Lyon, 2000; Kranton and Minehart, 2000; 
Kranton, 1996; Platteau, 1994, 1994b; Rauch and Casella, 1998 and World Bank, 2002) 
or empirical evidence (Fafchamps, 1996, 1999; Guiso et al, 2000; Fafchamps and Minten, 
1999; Barr, 2000; Barrett, 1997; McMillan and Woodruff, 1998, 2000; Fafchamps and  
Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and  Gubert, 2007; Weerdt and Dercon, 2006b; Palaskas and  
Harriss-white, 1993;  Gabre-Madhin, 2001b and Gabre-Madhin et al., 2003) did clearly 
support the above conclusion.  
 
As proved by Fafchamps (2002), if the gain from trade is very low, there will be low 
level of networking in the market. As result some locations will be dominated by few 
networked traders, if the search cost is high (ibid). Unfortunately, the existence of social 
capital and market failures in that area, by deterring entry, will sustain uncompetitive 
behivor of the few traders, unchecked by competition. Means areas with out adequate 
trade flow or being excluded from the main trading route may show low level of 
cointegration with other markets, even if they are located in close proximity to other 
markets. And this is shown to be the case in Niger livestock market (Fafchamps and 
Gavian, 1996). Under such reality, transportation convinces is not the only factors which 
determine the cointegration of market prices and the ‘border’ of one price system. It is 
possible a market in short distance from the trading center but with low trade flow and 
dysfunctional institutions to be dominated by few traders, with manipulative behavior. 
This hypothesis is clearly backed by studies which show that even though transportation 
infrastructure is very important for market integration, transportation convince alone 
can’t explain market integration and efficiency (Rapsomanikis and Karfakis, 2007; 
Fafchamps, 1996; Fafchamps and Gavian, 1996 and Palaskas and Harriss-white, 1993). 
This is so since customers facing high transaction cost can’t make frequent and small 
quantity purchase from the near by market. But again hording of goods is not optional 
due to liquidity problem related to low income and dysfunctional credit market.  
 
However once the markets are cointegrated under rule of one price, implying they are 
having functional institutions, the speed of adjustment to system wide shock will depend 
to higher extent on transportation convince and to some extent on efficiency of local 
institutions. If markets are cointegrated under rule of one price, it means the local 
institutions are functional. However functionality, in opposite to optimality, is a relative 
term. So, still areas with relatively more functional institutions will be much efficient in 
correcting shocks than areas with relatively less functional institutions. As result 
transportation convinces, given its important share in transaction cost of developing 
economies (Minten and Kyle, 1999; Fafchamps and Hill, 2008 and Gabre-Madhin, 
2001b), will become more important factor in determination of speed of adjustment. In 
general, it is very logical to expect the fact that market integration, in contrary to speed of 
adjustment after system wide shocks, to be less dependent on transportation cost. And 
this is found to be the case in this paper.         
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III. Econometric methodology 
  
3.1. Introduction to econometric methodology  
 
The main focus of the paper is to determine the long run and short run relationship that 
exists between spatially dispersed wheat market prices, based on vector error correction 
model (VECM). The level of integration of wheat markets, located in different parts of 
the country, under the rule of one price is very informative in guiding stabilization efforts 
in to optimal locations. The stabilization policy in wheat markets, which was 
implemented by state, even though was found to be effective in slowing the inflationary 
tendency, it was not found to be very effective in solving the inflationary problem (                  
). So, still there is need for identification of optimal locations in order to guide current 
and future interventions in grain market.   
 
If markets, located in different locations, are highly integrated, few or even one market/s 
can be used to stabilize the whole country. If there are many markets under rule of one 
price, the market/s place where optimal intervention can be targeted can be identified 
depending on the statistical significance of the adjustment parameters, the speed of 
adjustment of each market to ward equilibrium and the relative importance of each 
market in determination of the single common trend. But, if the markets are not 
integrated under rule of one price, optimal stabilization will demand simultaneous 
intervention in different part of the country.        
 
The prices of the same grain discovered in different markets are expected to have an 
equilibrium long run relationship, which can be modeled by VECM. The conventional 
approach to VECM is first, to determine the appropriate lag, by one of the few 
information criterions. And then, by using the above selected lag in the VECM, to 
determine the number of cointegration vectors found among the prices. (Johansen, 1988, 
1991, 1992) Assuming that there are theoretical bases, which can identify the 
cointegration equations from the space spanned by them, the above procedure is simple, 
but fruitful two step procedure. 
 
If 1n −  cointegration relations (vectors) are found among n  prices, there is no 
identification problem, as all markets are pair wise cointegrated and all are following a 
single common trend
2
 (Gonzalez – Rivera and Helfand, 2001). But, if the number of 
cointegration relationships are less than 1n − , there will be identification problem; in 
which neither theory nor empirical evidence will be any help. Empirical evidence or 
specifically the estimated parameters identify the space spanned by the cointegrating 
vectors, not the true cointegrating vectors. Normally, theory is used in order to fix the 
restrictions needed to identify the cointegration equations. Theoretically, unless 
transaction costs, of creating space utility, are very high, all market prices are expected to 
be pair wise cointegrated. This theoretical view point is too general to identify the 
cointegration vectors. This very fact will create identification problem, if there are more 
than one common trend between n  prices.  
                                                 
2
 Still out of 2
nC  cointegration vectors only 1n − are relevant and others are redundant.   
 8 
Despite high possibility of omitted variable bias, on estimated parameters (ibid); the 
above mentioned identification problem is the reason why most cointegration analysis on 
market prices have been limited to biveriate analysis. Fortunately, a simple grid search 
procedure is proposed by Gonzalez –Rivera and Helfand (2001) to solve the 
identification problem. The grid search procedure and the needed modification on it are 
explained below. 
          
3.2. Methodological base of the grid search process  
 
If given number of market locations are following, one common trend, each location will 
be pair wise cointegrated with every other location. However, all bivariete vectors need 
to be estimated in full dimension. When higher dimension cointegration is estimated 
using lower dimension or bivariate cointegrations, specification bias will be introduced 
due to omitted error terms (Gonzalez – Rivera and Helfand, 2001). Therefore, the 
concentration of most research papers, which includes Dawson and Dey (2002), Gali and 
Brown (2002), Fafchamps and Gavian (1996), Dercon (1995), Palaskas and Harriss-white 
(1993) and soon, on bivariate analysis is not sound; though understandable given the 
identification problem that can be expected, if all markets are not pair wise cointegrated.  
 
Innovate methodology, to solve this problem, was proposed and used in Brazil rice 
market by Gonzalez – Rivera and Helfand (2001). The ideas it to start from m  well 
connected markets which are following one common trend. And sequentially to add more 
markets, given all included markets are sharing one common trend. In Brazil rice market 
distance was found to be an important determinant factor for order of inclusion; when the 
search is started from 10 markets to build a network of 15 markets. This methodology is 
adapted by Rashid (2004) to Uganda Maize market. Starting from capital city of Uganda, 
Kampala, and other major trading center, Jinja, additional markets are included in to the 
rule of one price system based on their distance from capital city.  
 
There are two problems to the methodology proposed by Gonzalez – Rivera and Helfand 
(2001). Let’s start from the first one. Since lower dimension estimation of higher 
dimension system can introduce omitted variable bias, the search procedure is 
theoretically unsound. Omitted variable bias expected in lower dimension estimation will 
make cointegration analysis none transitive. It is theoretically possible that three markets, 
which are not cointegrated at biveriate level, to be cointegrated at third dimension. And 
such occurrence was wrongly interpreted by Rapsomanikis and Karfakis (2007) to be 
caused by specification bias and data problem.  
 
Second, even if, in relatively more advanced economy of Brazil distance is found to be 
the main determinant factor for order of inclusion, why it should be the case in relatively 
less developed market of Uganda? It is true that distance matters for market efficiency 
and cointegration (Goletti et al., 1995; Rapsomanikis and Karfakis, 2007; Overa, 2006 
and Fafchamps and Gavian, 1996). But spatial arbitration is not only about transporting 
goods in space. To quote North, as cited in Gabre-Madhin (2001:1) 
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“There have always been gains from trade . . . but so too have there been obstacles to 
realizing these gains. If transport costs were the only obstacle, then we would observe 
through history an inverse relationship between transport costs, on the one hand, and 
trade and exchange and the well-being of societies on the other.”  
                  
This is a clear point to show the fact that creating space utility is not about transporting 
goods, only. This is so, even if roads and efficient transportation facility can contribute 
for distributional efficiency and economic growth, as shown by Dercon (2006). Actually 
a study by Gabre-Madhin et al. (2003) did show that in Ethiopia transportation cost, even 
for long distance traders, is not as high as sacking and handling cost. High sacking and 
handling cost is caused by lack of trust and it can be reduced by development of 
networks. The same is the case for search cost, which is found to be as high as 17% of 
transaction cost in Ethiopia (Gabre-Madhin, 2001 and Gabre-Madhin, 2001b). So, given 
the fact that Ethiopia is one of the countries in Africa with least road density (Gabre-
Madhin et al., 2003 and Gabre-Madhin, 2001b) and still in Ethiopia other transaction 
costs are, at least, as important as distance, it is not sound to think order of inclusion in 
Uganda or other developing economies will be determined by distance only. This 
hypothesis is in line with findings of some researchers. Studies did clearly show that 
spatial arbitration and its efficiency is not sole function of distance. (Rapsomanikis and 
Karfakis, 2007 and Fafchamps and Gavian, 1996)    
 
Let’s focus in the first challenge and actual application of the methodology on real data. 
The omitted variable bias will be a series problem in two special and extreme cases, only. 
In first case, the problem will be series when all locations are highly cointegrated and 
each location is correcting the shocks ignited in every other location. In such case most of 
the shock initiated in two pair of locations will be corrected by all locations. Unless this 
fact is taken in to account, in the estimation processes, bias on estimated parameters will 
be very series. As result, not only we may wrongly reject cointegration relation ship 
between prices, but also the error vector may not be white nose. In the second case, series 
omitted variable bias will be observed when the country is having two groups of 
cointegrated market locations, which are not cointegrated to each other. In which one of 
the two must be highly cointegrated and the other need to be less cointegrated. So, the 
search procedure will identify the weak group, since there will not be a series omitted 
variable bias. Unfortunately, it will fail to identify the second group; since, by the 
implicit assumption of the search procedure, higher dimension cointegrations have to be 
based on lower dimension cointegrations. Excluding these two extreme possibilities, 
which are less probable in developing economies, without series and localized civil or 
military conflict, the omitted variable bias will not be a series problem.  
 
In actual markets found in developing economies, some market combinations will not 
have perfect cointegration with every market, in the rule of one price. As result, they may 
solely correct their own shocks. If these markets are exogenous to other markets, their 
cointegration at lower dimension will not introduce omitted variable bias. And the grid 
search process will build the system of one price by adding the next market location, 
which is dependent on those cointegrated market locations and itself only. Finally, highly 
cointegrated market locations will be identified, in the last part of the search process. It is 
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possible that identifiable cointegrated market locations could be more than 2 and it is 
necessary to keep searching, until the minimum cointegrated dimensions are found. Or as 
alternative, it is possible to start the search process from large number of markets, which 
are expected to be highly cointegrated to each other, as is done by Gonzalez – Rivera and 
Helfand (2001), on their analysis of Brazil rice market. In addition, if at given dimension, 
markets are not found to have one common trend, the search has to continue, until all 
combination at each dimension are tested. This is so, since lower dimension estimation of 
higher dimension systems will introduce omitted variable bias. So the failure to find one 
common trend in lower dimensions could be due to omitted variable bias.   
     
There are three, additional factors, which could influence the search result. First is the 
level of external shocks, like food aid, injected   in to the market. If there is high level of 
external shock injected into some markets, it can possibility break the co-moment 
between these market prices and others. This is especially true, if these markets are price 
takers. Second, if the level data of some locations are not white nose, they may need fully 
specified higher dimension cointegration model, in order to have white nose error terms. 
As result, normality, serial correlation or ARCH/GARCH testes will, wrongly, reject 
their cointegration with others; even when one common trend is found. The third factor is 
related to the relative importance of a given grain in portfolio of the local traders. If the 
traders are highly engaging in other more important commodities, say coffee or chat in 
Ethiopia case, and grain trade is not the most important source of profit, they may fail to 
react for each grain price deviation from equilibrium. And he/she may not exert full effort 
to develop and sustain grain trading networks (Greif 1993). This will affect both the 
probability of being part of the rule of one price system and speed of adjustment to 
system wide shocks, if they are part of the system. If such market is found to be 
cointegrated with other markets; shocks ignited in this market will be corrected by other 
markets. This will make the market weakly exogenous. In the search processes, this 
market will not be able to be identified, unless all important markets are included in the 
vector of market prices. However, if the weakly exogenous market is the central market 
and the shocks are corrected by the specific redial market only, it will be an ideal central 
market for identification in the search process. 
 
As strategy, it is important to start the search process from central market and important 
but relatively isolated market, with white nose level data. The market must be highly 
dependent on the central market, but not directly on other markets. Moreover, it is 
preferable, if the central market is weakly exogenous to shocks coming from other 
markets, if the local traders’ profits in radial market are highly dependent on the 
dynamics of specific grain price; if there is efficient marketing infrastructure; if the 
location has long history of trade link and so on. This is farther refinement of Gonzalez – 
Rivera and Helfand (2001) and Rashid (2004) search methodology, based on theoretical 
development of new institutional economics.  
 
The finding (Gonzalez – Rivera and Helfand, 2001) and assumption (Rashid, 2004) of the 
t=wo early papers is that order of inclusion in to the rule of one price is sole function of 
distance from capital city or central hub market of the country. This is assumption is the 
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second short coming of the proposed grid search procedure and it is going to be 
addressed, below. 
  
Order of inclusion, in to the rule of one price, is not directly related to strength of 
cointegration. Order of inclusion is related to existence of conditions, which minimize the 
specification bias. Among them, one is low level cointegration with all market locations, 
except the central hub. Moreover, strength of cointegration is not sole function of 
distance. So, distance can’t be used as the only determinant factor in order of inclusion. 
However, if the markets are under the rule of one price, the speed of correction to system 
wide shocks may be highly dependent on transportation cost. If they are part of the rule 
of one price system, they will normally have functional institutions, storage facilities and 
transpiration services. As result distance will be a very critical, but not the only, factor for 
speed of error correction following the occurrence of system wide shocks.  
 
Unfortunately, this fact can’t necessarily apply to adjustment parameters. If the system is 
facing high amount of shocks, that can’t be easily digested, it will fail to have 
cointegration under one common trend. So, if there are markets in the one price system, 
in which their shock is hard to digest, there must be very small amount of shocks coming 
from these markets. As result the variance related to these markets will be small and their 
contribution to the system wide shock will be small. In such scenario, these markets’ 
speed of adjustment to system wide shock will be related, mostly, to shocks coming from 
other markets. These markets can have quick adjustment to system wide shock, if they 
are closely located to the central market. However, if their own shock is taken in to 
account, by measuring adjustment parameters, they may have very slow adjustment 
process, since the system can’t easily digits shocks coming from these markets.  
 
The main hypothesis of this part of the paper is that the grid search methodology used by 
early papers to search for cointegratd markets, which are ruled by one price system, is 
theoretically unsound; but practically can be very useful. However, distance can’t be the 
main determinant factor for order of inclusion of markets, in to the rule of one price. In 
this paper to prove or disprove the above hypothesis, a routine search is made on all 
possible permutation of markets starting from 2
nd
 dimension up to 8
th
 dimension, 
maximum number of dimension considered under this study. And the routine search 
procedure followed in this paper was able to generate the same network of markets that 
can be found, if we follow the simple Gonzalez – Rivera and Helfand (2001) grid search 
methodology, with modifications given above. This will be very useful step in justifying 
the methodology proposed by Gonzalez – Rivera and Helfand (2001); which can improve 
the applicability of multivariate cointegration analysis for market prices. Given this 
methodological facts related to the search process, the econometric models used in this 
paper are explained below.  
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3.3. Econometric models  
3.3.1. Vector Error Correction Model  (VECM) 
 
The log price ( )P of a commodity, in given market ( )i , can be presented by variable iP . 
And all n  numbered log prices, in n  locations, can be presented by n  dimensional 
vector P .  
 
[ ]1 2 . . . nP P P=
'P …………..…………………..……….…...……………….1 
If the prices are cointegrated, based on Granger representation theorem (Engle and 
Granger 1987), they will have the following error correction representation.  
 
'
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 ....  t t t P t p t t− − − − + −∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ − +P α + γt ζ P ζ P ζ P βA P ε ..……….……….2 
Vector tε  is a white nose n  dimension vector, with variance covariance matrix of Ω . In 
which ( )' 0tE τ =ε ε  for t τ≠ , means the error vector is serially independent, and  
( )'tE τ = Ωε ε  for t τ= , means there error vector has constant variance covariance 
matrix. The ( )n h×  matrix of A  is the cointegrating vector, which defines the long run 
relationship between 1h +  prices. The number of cointegration equations or vectors ( )h  
will be identified by using trace statistics, developed by Johansen (1988, 1991, 1992).  
The ( )n h×  matrix of β  represents adjustment parameters. The adjustment parameters 
are measures of the speed of adjustment to ward equilibrium, after any shock.  
 
The cointegration equations are estimated based on the assumption of normally, 
independently and identically distributed error vector (Johansen, 1988, 1991, 1992 and 
Hamilton, 1994).  But as was developed in Johansen (1988, 1991, 1992) and clearly 
explained in Hamilton (1994), the most critical assumption is the serial independence of 
the error vector. Asymptotically, normality and homoskedasticy of the variance are not 
binding assumptions. In this paper, even though the time period is 8 years (1996 – 2003), 
which is not very small for cointegration analysis, the use of monthly data did restrict the 
number of observations to just 96. So normality, independence and constancy of the 
variance are demanded in each VECM estimated in the grid search process.  
 
For normality Jarque and Bera (1980, 1981) or J-B test and for serial correlation LM test 
developed by Breusch (1978), Breusch and Pagan (1980) and Godfrey (1978) are used. 
This is justifiable given Demiroglu (2000) for J-B test and Brüggermann et al (2006) for 
LM test did show the fact that these testes are robust for testing the distribution 
assumption of cointegrated series. The Johansen VECM and related rank testes are 
asymptotically applicable for both homoskedastic and heteroskedastic errors (Johansen, 
1988, 1991, 1992; Hamilton, 1994; Cavaliere et al, 2009 and Lee and Tse, 1996). 
However, in small and moderately small samples heteroskedasticity is observed to reduce 
the power of rank testes, marginally (Lee and Tse, 1996 and Cavaliere et al, 2009). To 
test for auto regressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effect, discovered by 
Engle (1982), or its extension to generalized auto regressive conditional 
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heteroskedasticity (GARCH), discovered by Bollerslev (1986), we can use the residuals 
from the vector error correction model. The test for ARCH(q) or GARCh(p, q) = ARCh(p 
+ q)  will follow conventional distributions, under the null of white nose errors. Once the 
cointegration equations are estimated, the next step is to estimate the main determinants 
of the common trend. This is done by following Gonzalo and Granger (1995) 
methodology, explained below.  
     
3.3.2. Estimation of common trend  
 
If n  markets are under rule of one price, there will be 1n h− =  cointegration relations 
and 1 common trend. The estimation of this single common trend will be useful, in order 
to understand the importance of a given market in determination of the common trend. A 
market (1) which is highly cointegrated with other markets, (2) which is having 
significant impact on the common trend, (3) which is having short persistence of shocks 
and (4) which is more or less weakly exogenous will be the market where efficient 
stabilization can be done, in cost effective manure. The estimation of the long run trend 
will be done using Gonzalo and Granger (1995) linear decomposition of price vector in to 
permanent and temporary component as    
   

1      tt tf= +P A P …………………………………………………………...……………..3 
Where tP , 1A  and 

tP  are n  dimension vectors and tf  is a scalar of common trend. So 
the prices are function of permanent component ( )tf  loaded by loading vector ( )1A  plus 
temporary component ( )tP . The basic assumption imposed, by Gonzalo and Granger 
(1995), and used to estimate the common trend is that, first f  is linear on observed prices 
and second, the temporary component does not have permanent impact on prices.  
Formally the first assumption implies    
 
'
t tf ⊥= a P  ……………………………………………………………………………4 
The vector of coefficient in equation 4 or '⊥a  is related to the null space of the 
cointegrated vectors, as shown by Gonzalo and Granger (1995). The statistical and 
numeric significance of '⊥a  will be used to identify price makers and price takers in the 
rule of one price system. And as proved by Gonzalo and Granger (1995) a conventional 
Wald test can be applied to coefficients in equation 4, given the vector error correction 
model is correctly specified, identified and estimated by Johansen (1988, 1991, 1992) 
VECM frame work.  Or alternatively, we can use the following log likelihood test  
  
( ) ( )( )
1
ln 1 / 1
P
P i P
i r
LL T λ λ−
= +
= − − −∑ ………………………………………………………5 
Where pλ  is the smallest Eigen value in the unrestricted model and p iλ −  is smallest 
Eigen value, when the impact of i  markets is constrained at zero. The above statistics 
will follow Chi2 distribution, with p m−  degree of freedom. Where p  and m  are 
number of Eigen values in unrestricted and restricted models, respectively.  
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3.3.3. Estimation of persistence profile  
 
As rightly stated by Pesaran and Shin (1996) researches which simply focus in long run 
may not be complete and may not be able to generate very useful recommendation for 
policy makers, unless their long run analysis is complemented by short run analysis. So, 
in order to measure short run dynamics of prices, a persistence profile developed by 
Pesaran and Shin (1996) and the adjustment parameters, estimated in VECM, are used in 
this paper. The idea behind persistence profile is explained below. 
 
In bivariate error correction model the size of the adjustment parameters and the 
statistical significance of the adjustment parameters will be used to analyze the short run 
dynamics of the market. If an adjustment parameter is -0.33, it means it will take 3 (= 
1/0.33) periods for the market to correct shocks initiated in its long run relationship with 
the other market in the bivariate analysis. Moreover, if a market’s equation has shorter 
lag, it means the market is having short memory of past shocks or to follow Ravallion 
(1988) thinking it is strongly cointegrated with the other market, in the bivariate analysis. 
To summarize the impact of both short run groups of parameters, impulse response 
functions are widely used in literature. However, impulse response functions are found to 
be less informative, if shocks happening to different prices are correlated. And the 
orthogonaization method used to solve the problem is found to be inconclusive, since it is 
order sensitive (Pesaran and Shin, 1996).         
  
Following Pesaran and Shin (1996), persistence profiles are used to measure short run 
behavior of markets. The advantage of persistence profile is related to the fact that it is 
order insensitive, when measuring the temporal impact of system wide shock, equal to 
'Α ΩΑ , injected in to the cointegration vector. Where Α  is the cointegrating vector and 
Ω  is the variance covariance matrix. Following a system wide shock equal to 'Α ΩΑ , at 
period zero, the change in variance of forecast error, in period n , is given by 
' '
n nΑ Α ΩΑ Α . At a limit, given Α  is a cointegrating vector, 
' '
n nΑ Α ΩΑ Α  will approach 
zero. So, the temporal adjustment process, following a system wide shock equal to 
'Α ΩΑ , can be presented, in relative terns, by the relative persistence profile given by      
 
( ) ( )( )1' 'n nn −= × 'h Α Α ΩΑ Α Diag Α ΩΑ …………………………………………………..6 
The value of ( )nh  will range from 1, when 0n = , to 0, when n = ∞ . The value of ( )nh , 
at given period of n , will measure a fraction of the initial system wide shock ( 'Α ΩΑ ), 
which is persisting at that period. For example, if ( )2 0.3=h , it means 30% of the system 
wide shock is not corrected at second period or similarly 70% of the system wide shock is 
corrected at second period.  
 
In this paper weighted mean and first month persistence are used, as summery measures 
of persistence profile. Weighted mean is the simple weighted average of all periods from 
0 to 30, the weight being the level of persistence in each period. Moreover given most the 
shock is observed to evaporate in first month, first month than median persistence 
advocated by Gonz´alez-Rivera and Helfand (2001) is used.  
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IV. Discussion and analysis 
4.1. Introduction to Discussion and analysis 
 
Before presenting result of analysis, there is a need to emphasize the importance of 
appropriate lag selection for VECM. In theory, the VECM is estimated assuming the 
appropriate lag for the model is known in advance. Unfortunately, this is not the case in 
real empirical estimation of the model. The true lag of the model is estimated by using 
different information criterions proposed in literature. The most commonly used four 
information criterions are, also, used in this paper. These are Hannan and Quinn 
information criterion (HQIC), Final prediction error (FPE), Schwartz's Bayesian 
information criterion (SBIC) and Akaike's information criterion (AIC). However, it is 
common to find different lags been selected by different information criterions; as was 
the case in this paper. This will complicate the modeling process, because not only none 
of the information criterions is theoretically superior to other criterions, for all data 
generating process
3
; but also, because, the VECM is very sensitive to both over 
identification and under identification problem (Winker and Maringer, 2004). Study by 
Ho and Sørensen (1996), for example, indicated the fact that when longer lags are used 
inappropriately, Johansen’s rank testes have tendency to over estimate the number of 
cointegration vectors found in the model. In this paper, the criterions are taken not as 
perfect predictors of the true lag, but as lag band width selectors. Means the maximum 
and minimum lag used in VECM will be related to the maximum and minimum lags 
selected by any of the information criterions. And the specific lag, with in the above 
band, is selected based on the white nosiness of the error vector.  
         
The second problem is related to the fact that: lag selected by all information criterions is 
found to be very sensitive to the maximum lag allowed in the lag searching process. In 
theory the maximum lag is assumed to be known, in advance. But this is not the case, in 
actual empirical analysis. When inappropriate and shorter maximum lag is allowed, the 
information criterions can under fit the right model. And when inappropriate and longer 
lag is used, the criterions have tendency to pick the maximum lag
4
. In this paper different 
maximum lags are allowed and the frequently selected (modal) lag is used, in the 
estimation of the VECM. This procedure has two advantages. First, it will not result on 
highly under fitted model since longer maximum lags, as well as shorter maximum lags, 
are allowed. Second, it will reduce the probability of over fitting and mainly over fitting 
that can result from the use of inappropriate and longer maximum lag. Given these facts, 
it is time to present result of analysis below. 
   
4.2. Identification of markets under rule of one price   
 
The first step, in cointegration analysis, is to find number of unit roots found in each price 
(variables). Unit root tests are done in both level and first difference of prices, by using 
                                                 
3
 See Winker and Maringer (2004), Ho and Sørensen (1996), Khim and Liew (2004), Gutiérrez et al (2007), 
Chao and Phillips (1999) and others for conflicting result.  But more robust analysis with diverse data 
generating process is found in study by Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2000).   
4
 Study by Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2000) did show that when longer lags are allowed in small or moderate 
samples, all information criterions have tendency to pick the maximum lag allowed. And this is widely 
observed in this paper.   
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Augmented Dick and Fuller test and related F- Version testes (Dickey and Fuller, 1979). 
Following the recommendation of, both, Hamilton (1994) and Peterson (2000), general to 
specific search for number of unit roots that can be found in each price is done. In 
addition to F – version testes, graphic or visual inspection of the data is used to select the 
appropriate ADF test. For brevity, the test results are not presented here. In the unit root 
testes, that are done, all prices are found to be difference stationery. Establishing the fact 
that all prices are following one unit root, it is time to find how many of them are 
following one common trend.   
     
As stated above, since the information criterions are observed to pick different lags and 
there is no theoretical reason to select one over the other, the information criterions are 
taken as lag band width selectors than the right lag selectors. This is logical, since some 
of them are more probable to have down ward bias and others are more probable to have 
up ward bias. The specific lag with in the band is selected based on distribution of the 
error terms and the number of common trends found in vector of prices. If one common 
trend can’t be found or if the distributional assumptions are not attained, with in the 
aforementioned band, the combination will be dropped as unfit.  
 
The logical VECM models for grain prices are restricted constant, unrestricted constant 
and restricted trend (Dawson and Dey, 2002). Based on log likelihood test, the restricted 
constant model is found to be the most appropriate model from the three appropriate 
models. However in order to isolate the effect of seasonal variation, a restricted constant 
model is used in this paper
5
. Market combinations which are found to have one common 
trend with right identification assumption are reported in table 1, below. Again for 
brevity normality, serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (ARCH/GARCH) test results 
are not reported here, even though these testes are done at each stage. J-B test of 
normality is found to be highly order sensitive, so all permutations, than combinations, of 
markets are tested for normality. The permutations of markets given in table 1, below, are 
related to order of markets with highest J-B statistics.               
  
Table 1, below, clearly shows the fact that for all combinations the null of more than one 
common trend is rejected at 1%. But, the null of one common trend can’t be rejected at 
5%, let alone at 1%. So, it is logical to accept all combinations, given in table 1 below, 
are following one common trend. At second dimension, the central market of Addis 
Ababa was found to be cointegrated with surplus market of Bale Robe, at South, and 
Deficit market of Jimma, at south West. Moreover, the deficit market Dire Dawa, at east, 
was found to be cointegrated with surplus market of Bale Robe. At third dimension, the 
above four markets are observed to follow two common trends. Jimma and Bale Robe, in 
one direction, with central market of Addis Ababa and, in other direction, with deficit 
market of Dire Dawa are found to have a single common trend. However, in fourth 
dimension, Dire Dawa was dropped and two groups of markets are observed to follow 
                                                 
5
 Actually the three models are estimated. The difference between restricted constant and unrestricted 
constant models is related to the fact that the restricted constant model was not able to be extended in to 
fifth dimension. And restricted trend model was not able to be extended behind third dimension. Mekelle is 
found to be cointegrated with Addis Ababa, Bale Robe and Jimma but not others when restricted trend 
model is used.          
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two and different common trends. Jimma, Addis Ababa and Bale Robe are found to have 
one common trend with deficit market of Gonder, located in North West side of the 
country. But, in second group the secondary central market of Nazret, at center, was 
found to be cointegrated with Jimma, Bale Robe and Gonder.     
 
Table 1 Trace test for cointegration rank 
Rank Markets 
 
Lags 
0 1 2 3 4 
A-B 1 24.021 1.998    
J-A 1 24.716 1.819    
D-B 1 20.3525 3.7354    
J-A-B 1 46.47 21.99 1.71   
J-D-B 1 41.079 21.093 3.287   
A-B-G-J 1 69.09 44.49 20.47 1.64  
B-G-J-N 1 64.53 42.35 20.46 1.71  
B-J-N-S-G 1 108.339 66.0289 41.605 21.3111 1.6685 
G-B-J-A-S 1 105.2824 65.6843 40.7827 20.0811 1.7859 
Critical values 
Number of common trends (p – r) 
Upper tail probability 1 2 3 4 5 
5% 3.76 15.41 29.68 47.21 68.52 
1% 6.65 20.04 35.65 54.46 76.07 
note  1  A – Addis Ababa, B –Bale Robe, D – Dire Dawa, G –Gonder, J – Jimma,  N-Nazret and S- Shashemene      
 
At fifth dimension, both groups are observed to add a surplus market of Shashemene, 
located at south central. However, both groups were not able to be cointegrated in to one 
common trend, in sixth dimension. Observing the aforementioned facts, it seems: if we 
follow the Gonz´alez-Rivera and Helfand (2001) methodology, we can identify the 
combination which includes Addis Ababa; but not the combination which includes 
Nazret. Fortunately, the estimation of the common trend, given below, will show the fact 
that both groups are actually following one common trend. The reason why the 
combination was not observed to be extended in to 6
th
 dimension was because the 
distributional assumptions of the VECM are valuated.  
 
This is why the methodology proposed by Gonz´alez-Rivera and Helfand (2001), though 
theoretically unsound, its shortcomings are more of a theoretical than real. But, there is 
need to make sure that the VECM is rightly specified at each stage. There is need to make 
sure the lag used is appropriate, which was not done in Rashid (2004), and the error terms 
are white nose at each stage of the search process, which was not done in both Gonz´alez-
Rivera and Helfand (2001) and Rashid (2004). Putting the above points in line, let’s 
interoperate the above result from institutional economics point of view, below.  
              
The most important markets, which are found to be cointegrated with every other 
market
6
, are Bale Robe and Jimma. Bale Robe is located in south central part of the 
                                                 
6
 Including Mekelle in restricted trend model (not reported here)  
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country, which is known for its wheat production. There were huge investments done, by 
pre 1991 government, in production and marketing infrastructural of the area, under Arsi 
Bale Rural Development unit – ABRDU (Nichola, 1985). When significant investments 
are done, in such high potential areas, it will open high potential gain from for future 
trade. That is why effective grain trade was easily established in short period of time, 
after 1989’s liberalization of the grain market, despite the fact that private trade used to 
be banned for years (Gabre-Madhin, 2001b). These fact shows that, when the potential 
gain from trade is very high, grain trade can spontaneously develop in short period of 
time, in line with Fafchamps (2002). This is additional evidence about the fact that 
institutional development is not solely determined by history, but by structure of 
production and consumption, too.  
 
Jimma, located in south west side of the country, is a major source of coffee and Chat 
export revenue for the country
7
. Moreover, historically, Jimma is one of the most 
important trade hubs of the country, since 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century (Seifu, 2002). So, 
following path of history or following the structure of production, it is not only very 
logical to expect high level of marketing infrastructure, social capital, trading networks 
and trading skill, but also highly effective demand for wheat. Given the location is major 
source of coffee and Chat, the two most important export commodity of the country at 
that time (NBE, 2005), and both are mainly produced by small scale farmers (Petty et al., 
2003), there will be highly effective demand for stable grains, like white wheat.    
 
The fact that distance can’t be the most important factor for order of inclusion was clearly 
shown in 4
th
 and 5
th
 dimensions. Shashemene, which is the next closely located market to 
the central hub of Addis Ababa following Nazret, was identified at 5
th
 dimension. 
Actually, to reach Bale Robe from Addis Ababa, you have to pass through Shashemene; 
but Bale Robe was identified at 2
nd
 dimension, before Shashemene. Since most roads of 
the country are built as redial from Addis Ababa (Gabre-Madhin, 2001b), it was not 
possible to make such analysis in other markets. However Gonder, which was not only 
located in relatively longer distance from Addis Ababa, but also connected with the 
center by one of the worst roads in the country, at that time, is included in to the one price 
system in 4
th
 dimension. Means at the same dimension with Nazret, which is located with 
in 100 km from the capital city! So, it is clear by now other factors, in addition to 
transportation cost, are playing important role in the order of inclusion.   
 
Shashemene is a central hub for Coffee and Chat export originating from Southern part of 
the country. Since the location is surplus market not only in wheat, but also in coffee and 
chat, traders may not try to develop adequate social capital in wheat traders; if wheat is 
not the most important commodity in their profit (Greif 1993). At the same time, if wheat 
trade is generating a very small share of their profit, they may fail to adjust their prices 
with every shock in the market. If the market is price maker, it will be, still, cointegrated 
with other markets. Since the market is weakly exogenous, it may not be able to be 
identified in lower dimension, unless the entire structure is taken in to account. These 
facts are observed to be true for Shashemene, as can been seen in the analysis of common 
                                                 
7
 Un published Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) data shows that Jimma 
contributed  11% of the coffee supplied to the market in the period of 1996 to 2003  
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trend and short run dynamics, given below. In case of Jimma, since it is a surplus market 
in Coffee and Chat and deficit market in wheat, the wheat market will not be crowded out 
by the export commodities. Actually, it will benefit from the trading externality generated 
by the export commodities.      
 
Additionally, Addis Ababa, Bale Robe and Jimma are observed to have more white-
nosily distributed level data, compared to others. Whenever, one common trend is found 
between these markets, the distribution of their error vector is observed to be white nose, 
in most cases. Since additive transformation of normally distributed price by constant or 
other normally distributed prices will always generate a normal variable, it is very 
logical, if the search is started from the more normally distributed prices. 
  
4.3. Identification of single common trend and its determinants 
 
Once markets which are following one common trend are identified, the next logical step 
is to estimate the common trend and its determinants. Market locations which are the 
most important determinants of the common trend are price makers and others are price 
takers. So, state intervention with objective of price stabilization, in order to be effective, 
has to target these price making locations. The methodology used here is based on 
permanent and transitory decomposition of variables, developed by Gonzalo and Granger 
(1995).  
 
In the analysis below, AF  means the common trend which is cointegrating the first group 
of five markets, which includes the central market of Addis Ababa. NF  means the 
common trend which is keeping the second group of five markets, which includes the 
secondary central market of Nazret, under rule of one price.  For the first combination of 
markets, which includes Addis Ababa, the common trend is estimated as following    
 
   -  4.3534381   -   9.2153955  -   6.1413652   -   4.8007328   11.096666AF A B J G S= +  
As can be seen above, the first and second main determinants of the common trend are 
producer centers of Shashemene and Bale Robe, respectively. This is additional evidence 
about the fact that order of inclusion in to system of one price is not a measure of the 
level of cointegration. The inclusion of markets, in to one price system, is related to the 
existence of conditions that can minimize the omitted variable bias. The next strong 
impact is coming from deficit market of Jimma. Both Gonder and Addis Ababa are 
having the lowest impact on common trend.  
 
Table 2 Statistical significance of the common trend parameters in group which includes Addis Ababa    
Null  Statistics Degree of freedom Probability 
A 0⊥ =a   1.398924 1 0.236904 
G 0⊥ =a  1.385296 1 0.239201 
A G 0⊥ ⊥= =a a  4.183143 2 0.123493 
J  0⊥ =a  27.88413 1 0 
A G J 0⊥ ⊥ ⊥= = =a a a  34.85149 3 0 
Note 2  A – Addis Ababa, G –Gonder and J – Jimma  
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Table 2, above, clearly shows the fact that the impact of both Addis Ababa and Gonder in 
the common cointegrating trend is statistically insignificant. The economic implication is 
that the deficit market of Gonder and the central market of Addis Ababa are price takers. 
In other words, the market clearing price is mainly discovered in surplus markets of 
Shashemene and Bale Robe and one deficit market of Jimma, in the period of 1996 to 
2003. This is against the early perception and conclusion of some researchers, who 
conclude that the central market of Addis Ababa is the main price marker and weakly 
exogenous to others
8
 (Dercon, 1995 and Gabre-Madhin, 2001b).  
 
When the second combination, which includes Nazret, is considered, producer centers, 
again, are observed to have more say in price formation of the one price system. The 
highest impact is coming from surplus market of Shashemene, followed by another 
surplus market of Bale Robe.  
 
N       F  =   -3.2450884N   -  9.2902753B  -  6.6893742J - 4.7592718G   + 11.280918S  
From deficit markets, the highest impact is observed to come from Jimma, followed by 
Gonder. The secondarily central market of Nazret is having the weakest impact on the 
common integrating trend. Table 3, below, is providing statistical justification for the 
above conclusion. In which, the most important markets in the price formation or the 
determination of the common trend are Shashemene, Bale Robe and Jimma, only.    
 
Table 3 Statistical significance of the common trend parameters in group which includes Nazret 
Null  Statistics Degree of freedom Probability 
N 0⊥ =a   0.65133 1 0.419638 
G 0⊥ =a  1.00927 1 0.315078 
N G 0⊥ ⊥= =a a  2.31193 2 0.314754 
J  0⊥ =a  30.2033 1 0 
N G J 0⊥ ⊥ ⊥= = =a a a  34.1758 3 0 
note  3  G –Gonder, J – Jimma and N-Nazret 
 
A restricted version of the common trend is estimated by dropping Addis Ababa and 
Gonder from the first combination and, Nazret and Gonder from the second combination. 
And both combinations are observed to have the same common trend, given below.  
 
     -10.66157741  -  8.422869842     10.11121128A NF F B J S= = +  
In the restricted version, both, surplus markets of Shashemene and Bale Robe are having, 
more or less, the same impact on the formation of the common trend, followed by deficit 
market of Jimma. This fact implies two things: first, the search procedure that is followed 
by early papers, though theoretically unsound, it is found to work for Ethiopian white 
wheat whole sale markets. And this was the case for Brazil rice markets, studied by 
Gonzalez – Rivera and Helfand (2001). The second important points is that the Johansen 
(1988, 1991, 1992) VECM developed for white nose errors is not adequate for all data 
                                                 
8
 The conclusions of these papers’ are based either in bivariate analysis (Dercon, 1995), or simple 
perception (Gabre-Madhin, 2001b).      
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generating processes. We may reject cointegrated markets as un-cointegrated, if the error 
vector is not having white nose distribution. Having good understanding of the long run 
process, it is now time to analyze the short run dynamics of the markets.        
 
4.4. Persistence profile and adjustment parameters among cointegrated markets  
 
The use of persistence profile (Pesaran and Shin, 1996) has two basic advantages. One is 
related to its capability to summarize the impact of both adjustment parameters and 
lagged shocks in to single index. Second its magnitudes are not effected by order of 
markets in VECM, for given identification assumption. However it is sensitive to 
identification assumption, imposed in the model. In this paper there are two choices for 
identification assumptions. One is to use identification assumption with highest 
probability of normality, as they are reported in preceding tables. The second option is to 
use identification assumption against the central market, which is found to be an 
important transit market in early studies (Dessalegn, 1997 and Dercon, 2005). The second 
one is very useful; but the first one is more logical given the over all VECM is dependent 
on white nose-ness of the error vector’s distribution. Fortunately, significant difference 
was not observed in both options, so the most informative identification against central 
markets is given below.   
 
4.4.1. Market combinations which include Addis Ababa  
 
As can be seen in table 4 below, in the first combination of markets, which includes 
Addis Ababa, the lowest persistence is observed in customer center of Jimma. In Jimma 
and in first month, more than 65% of the system wide shock is corrected. For Jimma 
mean persistence is found to be 66% of a month or around 20 days. Means, it will take 20 
days to eliminate most of the system wide shock. The worst persistence is observed in 
another customer center of Gonder, which is located in considerable distance from the 
four markets. The first month persistence in Gonder is close to 51% and it will take, 
approximately, 29 days to neutralize most of the system wide shock, on average. Both 
producer centers are in the middle, in which Shashemene is having the next lowest 
persistence; with first month persistence of just less than 35%. As result it will take, 
approximately, 20 days to eliminate most of the system wide shock. However, Bale 
Robe’s performance is close to the performance of Gonder than others. On average it is 
observed to take 25 days to eliminate most of the system wide shock, with first month 
persistence of 43%.          
 
Table 4 Summery statistics for Persistence between Addis Ababa and other 4 markets  
Market combination A – S A – J A – B A – G 
Mean persistence in months 0.663446 0.606972 0.815844 0.964209 
Mean persistence in days 19.90338 18.20916 24.47532 28.92627 
First month Persistence (%)  0.34834 0.318259 0.433251 0.507999 
note  4  A – Addis Ababa, B –Bale Robe, G –Gonder, J – Jimma and S- Shashemene      
 
If we take persistence profile as measure of the degree of market integration, Addis 
Ababa is more cointegrated with Jimma and Shashimiene than Bale Robe and Gonder. 
Jimma (330 km) and Shashimiene (306 km) are located in close proximity to the central 
 22 
market of Addis Ababa, compared to both Gonder (379 km) and Bale Robe (430 km). So 
distance seems to be important factor for degree of integration. In addition to distance, 
road quality, also, seems to play a very important role. Given the fact that both Jimma 
and Shashimiene are strategically important to the major export market of coffee and 
chat, they are supplied with relatively better quality roads, at that time. So, even though 
distance and road quality are not the critical factors determining order of inclusion of 
markets in to the rule of one price; once the markets are under rule of one price and the 
more closely located they are, the more cointegrated they will be. This is in line with 
earlier hypothesis, given in the theoretical part of this paper.    
       
Adjustment parameters focus in short run reaction of markets to shocks initiated in given 
cointegrating vector of two markets. These parameters are useful in identifying weakly 
exogenous markets. Such markets are preferable locations to intervene. This is so, since 
every change in the location’s price is related to change on long run market clearing price 
not to the short run random shocks.  
 
In the estimation process, given some ARCH/GARCH effect is observed at 5
th
 dimension 
of the VECM, robust standard errors are used to account for heteroskedasticity.
9
 As can 
be seen in table 5, below, any shock observed in the equilibrium relationship between 
Addis Ababa and Shashemene is not adjusted in Shashimiene. Additionally, Shashimiene 
is observed to be weakly exogenous to other markets. Moreover, when shocks are 
emanating form Shashimiene, all markets, but Gonder, are reacting in the wrong direction to 
amplify the shock. Similar pattern is observed between Bale Robe, another surplus market, and 
Addis Ababa. The central market of Addis Ababa is amplifying any shock, if the shock is 
initiated in surplus markets. When the surplus market is Shashemene most markets are going in to 
confusion and disarray.   
 
Table 5 Adjustment parameters in rule of one price which include Addis Ababa and other 4 markets  
Cointegrated market with Addis Ababa under 5
th
 
dimension 
LM test for over all 
significance (df-4) 
 
Shashemene Jimma Bale Robe Gonder Statistics  Prob. 
Shashemene -0.091 -0.016 0.055 0 1.25 0.8697 
Jimma 0.4*** -0.468*** 0.033 -0.142 27.69 0 
Bale Robe 0.35* -0.065 -0.197* 0.107 10.89 0.0278 
Gonder 0.161 0.018 0.004 -0.333*** 18.57 0.0010 
Addis Ababa 0.284** -0.043 0.131* -0.048 21.77 0.0002 
Note 5***, ** and * imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
   
Again, the strongest cointegration found between Jimma and Addis Ababa is also backed 
by adjustment parameters. It will take Jimma close to two months, or 2.14 months to be 
precise, to correct shock initiated in long run cointegration of Jimma with Addis Ababa. 
The relative figure for Bale Robe is 5 months and it is not significant at conventional 5% 
                                                 
9
 The effect of ARCH/GARCH effect on reducing the power of the rank test is very marginal. However, 
since the null of greater than one common trend are rejected at 99% confidence than conventional 95% 
confidence level. The marginally small reduction in power is not expected to generate significant effect 
rank test result. 
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level, but at 10% level. For Gonder, it will take 3 months to correct shocks initiated in the 
long run relationship between Addis Ababa and Gonder.  
 
In general, the customer centers of Jimma and Gonder have better information flow with 
Addis Ababa, than surplus markets of Shashemene and Bale Robe. Other markets are 
observed to inter in to confusion and disarray, when shocks are initiated in surplus 
markets. Focusing in theoretical implications: first, transportation convinces did not seem 
to be a critical factor for speed of adjustment, following a shock initiated in given 
cointegrating vector. Second, despite its significance in the determination of the single 
common trend, Shashemene was identified in the fifth dimension only. This is so, 
because the market is weakly exogenous to other markets and will not be identified 
unless the entire structure is taken in to account. Every result, stated above, is inline with 
each and every aforementioned hypothesis.      
          
4.4.2. Market combinations which include Nazret   
 
The short run dynamics in Nazret’s cointegration with other four markets, that is Jimma 
and Gonder, as deficit markets, and Shashemene and Bale Robe, as surplus markets, is 
analyzed and presented below. For presentation convince, Nazret is chosen as 
normalizing variable, given its service as secondarily central market (Gabre-Madhin, 
2001b).  
 
The lowest first month persistence is observed in Jimma and Shashimiene, followed by 
Bale Robe and Gonder. One interesting point about Shashemene is that: even though 65% 
of the system wide is shock is corrected in first month, it is observed to take 25 days to 
eliminate most of the shock. Means, the remaining shocks are having long memory and it 
will take longer time to eliminate them. The relative figure for Jimma is 18 days, for Bale 
Robe 22 days and for Gonder 25 days. 
 
Table 6 Persistence between Nazret and other 4 markets ruled by one price 
Market combination N – S N – J N – B N – G 
Mean persistence in months 0.835542 0.615152 0.730741 0.831335 
Mean persistence in days 25.06626 18.45456 21.92223 24.94005 
First month Persistence (%)  0.353012 0.320257 0.437202 0.440079 
note  6  B –Bale Robe, G –Gonder, J – Jimma, N-Nazret and S- Shashemene      
 
One important point to note is that: given Nazret is 100 km apart from Addis Ababa and 
the same markets are observed to have strong cointegration with Nazret as with Addis 
Ababa, it is clear that distance is an important factor for strength of cointegration. 
However Shashemene relative to Jimma and Bale Robe relative to Gonder are having 
more persistence, even though they are more closely located to both Nazret and Addis 
Ababa. This is in line with early hypothesis that, even though distance is expected to be 
more important factor for strength of cointegration (persistence of shocks), still strength 
of cointegration is not all about distance or transportation cost only.         
 
And table 7 below, shows that the fact that: even with in this group, Shashemene is 
weakly exogenous to other markets. Shashemene is not correcting any deviations from 
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equilibrium resulting in all cointegration equations.  Moreover, Jimma and to some extent 
Bale Robe are observed to amplify any disequilibrium resulting on the cointegration 
relation between secondary market of Nazret and Shashemene. Jimma and Gonder do 
correct their own deviations from equilibrium, in 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 months, respectively. As was 
the case above, speedy correction of shocks is observed in deficit market of Jimma, 
followed by another deficit market of Gonder. Both surplus centers of Shashemene & 
Bale Robe are not correcting shocks resulting on their long run relationship with Nazret.   
 
Table 7 Adjustment parameters in rule of one price which include Nazret and other 4 markets 
Cointegrated market with Shashemene under 5
th
 
dimension 
LM test for over 
all significance 
(df-4) 
Markets  
Shashemene Jimma Bale Robe Gonder Statistics  Prob. 
Shashemene -0.189 -0.025 -0.009 0.026 4.63 0.3274 
Jimma 0.431*** -0.458*** 0.058 -0.151 27.77 0 
Bale Robe 0.348* -0.089 -0.198 0.105 10.12 0.0384 
Gonder 0.106 0.008 -0.033 -0.319*** 19.85 0.0005 
Nazret 0.222 -0.042 0.149 -0.039 10.67 0.0305 
Note 7***, ** and * imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Only Shashemene is clearly weakly exogenous, since the null of weakly exogenous can’t 
be rejected at 32% level. For others the null is rejected at 5% level and mainly for Jimma 
and Gonder it is rejected at 1% level. Nazret’s reaction to shocks coming from any other 
market is statistically indifferent from zero, even though the market is not weakly 
exogenous. So the market will not be able to be identified in the rule of one price, unless 
the entire structure is built, first. This is another evidence to show the fact that inclusion 
of markets in to the system of one price is not directly related to strength of cointegration. 
It is simply related to existence of conditions which can minimize identification bias.  
 
V. Conclusion and Implication for price stabilization  
 
Let’s start from methodological contribution of this paper. In economy with scarcity of 
marketing infrastructure, widely observed market failures and missing markets, 
cointegration of prices is not solely related to transportation convenience, only. In 
addition to transportation convince, level of cointegration is related to development of 
complementary institutions to fill the gap left by formal institutions. These institutions 
will easily develop, if there is high gain from trade and if the social, cultural, political and 
historical preconditions for institutional development are there.  
  
Under such reality, order of inclusion of markets in to rule of one price will not be 
determined by distance, only. This is so because, first, order of inclusion in to the system 
of one price is not measure of strength of cointegration. Second, distance is not the most 
important, let alone the only, factor for cointegration of market prices. However once 
markets are part of the rule of one price, distance will be a very critical parameter for 
strength of cointegration; but, still, it is not the only determining factor. 
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The grid search methodology proposed by Gonzalez – Rivera and Helfand (2001) though 
theoretically unsound, practically the problems are not expected to be that series. This 
conclusion is observed to be right in Brazil rice market (ibid) and proved to be right in 
this paper. So, the methodology is important step in solving the unnecessary 
concentration of most research works in bivariate analysis.       
 
Now it is time to focus in price stabilization effort of the state. Out of the 8 markets 
considered in the study 7 are observed to have some form of cointegration with few or all 
markets, assuming there is no trend in transaction cost data. The exception being 
Mekelle, located in North drought porn area of the country. However, if trended 
transaction cost is allowed in the model, it was observed that even Mekelle is also having 
cointegration with important markets like Addis Ababa, Jimma and Bale Robe (not 
reported here). So, Ethiopian wheat market prices are clearly cointegrated to one another, 
in a sense that any change in one market price will be felt in other markets, some way or 
another. 
 
However, only 6 markets are found to follow a rule of one price. These markets include 
two central markets of Nazret and Addis Ababa, two surplus markets of Shashimiene and 
Bale Robe and two deficit markets of Gonder and Jimma. The two markets excluded 
from the rule of one price are Mekelle, which is food deficit market in north, and Dire 
Dawa, another food deficit market in East. Both markets are known for their large food 
aid dependent population and food aid has been blamed for distorting prices by some 
researchers (Jayne and Molla, 1995 and Amha et al, 1997). So, even though it need 
farther research, it is possible that both markets are found not to be part of the one price 
system, partially due to unmanageable shocks injected by food aid. This conclusion will 
make farther sense, if we consider the fact that the two deficit markets which are part of 
the one price system are Gonder and Jimma. Gonder is located in high potential North 
West part of the country and Jimma is populated by Chat and coffee producing small 
scale farmers. Population living in both areas has better purchasing power compared to 
population living in either Mekelle or Dire Dawa. Additionally, studies did also show that 
there is high level of inefficiency in Dire Dawa grain market (Dercon 1995 and Gabre-
Madhin et al. 2003). Mekelle was seriously affected by long civil war before 1991 & 
border war with Eritrea since 1998, which can negatively effect the development of the 
market. When there are limited gains from trade, such shocks can easily destroy the 
spontaneous development of markets, as predicted by Fafchamps (2002).      
 
With in 6 markets ruled by one price, market clearing price is discovered in two surplus 
markets of Bale Robe and Shashimiene and one deficit market of Jimma. Unfortunately, 
any shock initiated in both surplus markets of Bale Robe and Shashimiene is observed to 
take the system in to confusion and disarray, before it gets sorted out. Means wheat 
markets have better capacity to handle shocks coming from deficit markets than surplus 
markets. Additionally, though Shashemene is observed to be weakly exogenous to other 
markets, it is observed to has volatility cluster problem (not reported here for brevity). 
Focusing on persistence of shocks, it is observed persistence of system wide shock is 
higher in Gonder and Bale Robe, followed by Shashimiene and Jimma, respectively. 
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Based on the above facts, the logical policy implication is that 
 
1. If the focus of state intervention is in long run price stabilization, the intervention 
should concentrate in the two surplus markets of Bale Robe and Shashimiene. In short 
run, however, the national market will go in to disarray. Moreover, it may not be 
politically feasible to dump grain in surplus markets.  
2. Other option is to dump grains in deficit market of Jimma. By crowding out demand 
generated by export sector, it is possible to stabilize the grain market. Additional 
advantage of Jimma is that it will not create any significant short term volatility, as 
was the case for surplus markets. However, since the market is not weakly 
exogenous, there is need for dynamic national wide assessment of markets, before 
and after implementation of the stabilization policy. Fortunately, in the information 
age, that we live, this may not be a hard business to handle. Intervening in Jimma, 
however, is like giving subsidy to the relatively better off part of the society. As result 
it may not be politically feasible to implement such policy.  
3. Therefore, there is need to complement any intervention in Jimma, by subsidized 
distribution of food grains in food deficit areas without effective demand. 
Intervention in deficit markets, except Jimma, may be needed for equity purpose, but 
not for efficiency. This fact may also explain why the current price stabilization 
policy, which focuses in providing subsidized white wheat to the poor, fails to reverse 
the inflationary trend. 
 
Last but not the least point is that the data used in this paper is collected from 1996 to 
2003. The assumption is that the grain market structure is not altered then after. So any 
one who assumes that the structure is significantly altered, since then, has logical ground 
to doubt the conclusion and can possibly make similar analysis on current prices. 
However holding this assumption and result of this paper in prospective; it would not 
possible to expect such unprecedented increase in price level, when there was pamper 
harvest and low export revenue. This is why; result of this paper should not be taken at its 
face value, but as base line for future research.  
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